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Supply-side Policies to Conserve Biodiversity and Save the 
Orangutan from Oil Palm Expansion: 
An Economic Assessment 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Tropical forests are biodiversity-rich but are dwindling at a rapid rate, not only in 
Southeast Asia but elsewhere also. The result is a loss of natural ecosystems, a 
reduction in carbon sequestration, and increasing global extinction of wild species, 
including iconic species. While several developments contribute to the destruction of 
tropical forests, the main threat comes from their clearing for the purpose of 
agricultural production, for example in the Amazon Basin for the expansion of the 
beef industry and soya bean cultivation. In Borneo and Sumatra, the principal threat to 
tropical forests comes from the expansion of oil palm (Elaeis guineensis) cultivation. 
This is expected to result in significant biodiversity loss and is a danger to the 
continuing existence of the iconic orangutan (Pongo pygmaeus). The preferred route 
for oil palm expansion is by the conversion of lowland tropical forests to plantations. 
Lowland tropical forests are the prime habitat of the orangutan and this species is 
especially at risk as a result of oil palm expansion. Two supply-side policies have 
been suggested in the literature as ways to reduce this expansion and reduce pressure 
on species such as the orangutan. It has been recommended that Imperata cylindrica 
grasslands be used to help accommodate future oil palm expansion in Borneo and 
Sumatra and that emphasis be placed on raising the yield of oil palms. It is 
hypothesised that this will reduce the demand for clearing tropical forest for the 
purpose of oil palm expansion. Both of these hypotheses are critically evaluated by 
means of economic analysis. It is concluded that neither of these policies are likely to 
be very effective in reducing the clearing of tropical forests in Borneo and Sumatra in 
order to grow oil palm. 
 
Supply-side Policies to Conserve Biodiversity and Save the 
Orangutan from Oil Palm Expansion: 
An Economic Assessment 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The tropical forests are home to up to two thirds of all the species in the world yet 
these forests continue to be destroyed at a rapid rate (Pimm and Raven, 2000). The 
result is substantial loss of natural ecosystems and carbon storage and increased 
extinction of wild species, including some of the most unique plants and animals. 
While several developments contribute to the destruction of tropical forests, the main 
threat globally comes from their clearing for the purpose of agricultural production 
(compare Harting, 1880; Swanson, 1994; Geist and Lambin, 2002). In the Amazon 
Basin, for example, tropical forests are being cleared to make way for the expansion 
of the beef industry and for soya bean cultivation. 
 
In Southeast Asia, where deforestation rates have been high (Achard et al., 2002), the 
expansion of oil palm (Elaeis guineensis) planting in Borneo and Sumatra is a major 
source of loss of the biodiversity contained in the tropical forests of these areas. The 
forests of this region are known for their outstanding species richness and endemism 
(Whitten et al., 2004). Oil palm expansion is also a threat to the continuing existence 
of orangutan (Pongo pygmaeus) populations (Nelleman et al., 2007). The orangutan 
only exists in the forests of Borneo and Sumatra and is vulnerable to extinction as a 
result of the destruction of tropical forests (see, e.g., Tisdell and Swarna Nantha, 
2007). Already a large portion of these forests has been cleared to make way for oil 
palm plantations and expected further expansion in plantings will make substantial 
inroads into remaining stands of tropical forest. The private economic returns from oil 
palm cultivation are high and the highest economic returns can be obtained from the 
cultivation of these palms in areas containing lowland tropical forest because of the 
suitable agro-climate. These are the areas of greatest biological diversity and the 
preferred habitat of the orangutan, which requires the conservation of substantial 
tracts of tropical forest in order to survive. 
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In the literature, it has been suggested that the problem of forest-clearing for the 
expansion of oil palm production might be eased or solved by a combination of 
supply-side policies designed to reduce the need for tropical forests to be cleared to 
expand oil palm production (Koh, 2007; Koh and Wilcove, 2008). The two main 
policies proposed are (1) to limit plantings of oil palm to non-forested areas, 
particularly grasslands, and (2) to increase oil palm yields so that a larger volume of 
oil is obtained from existing plantations. It is argued here that these policies are 
unlikely to be very effective in reducing demands to clear forested areas for oil palm 
expansion. 
 
In this paper, we first of all provide some information about the demand for 
expanding the planting of oil palm in Indonesia and Malaysia and present projections 
of the likely expansion in the area planted and the extent of its expected encroachment 
on tropical forests. Its expected consequences for loss of biodiversity are noted. Then 
the suggestion that grasslands be used for future oil palm expansion is assessed. Next 
the contention that increased oil palm yields will reduce pressure on the clearing of 
tropical forest is considered before concluding. 
 
2. Projected Expansion of the Area Planted to Oil Palm in Indonesia and 
Malaysia and its Implications for the Conservation of Biodiversity and 
particularly the Orangutan 
 
Almost 10% of the world’s permanent cropland is planted with oil palm (Koh and 
Wilcove, 2008). Though more than 40 countries grow oil palm, 87% of palm oil 
output comes from Malaysia and Indonesia. The oil palm flourishes in the relatively 
constant tropical temperature and precipitation of these countries. 
 
Since 1990, the area cultivated with oil palm in Indonesia and Malaysia more than 
trebled (24,200 km2 to 82,100 km2 in 2006) (see Carter et al., 2007; FAO, 2008) 
(Figure 1). The average increase in cultivated area during this period would thus be 
about 3,650 km2 annually. Projections for the period 2005 and 2012 however indicate 
a rise in the annual increase in planted area, to about 6,221 km2 per year based on 
Carter et al. (2007). Total oil-palm cultivated land in Indonesia and Malaysia is 
expected to come close to 12,000 km2 by 2012, with most of the increase in planted 
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area likely to occur in Indonesia where suitable land is still plentiful. Expansion in 
Malaysia is likely to plateau in the long-term due to shortage of land.  
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Figure 1: The areas cultivated to grow oil palm in Indonesia and Malaysia between 
1990 and 2006 (based on Carter et al., 2007; FAO, 2008) and projections 
up till 2012 (based on Carter et al., 2007). 1 km2 equals 100 hectares. 
 
What amount of tropical forest loss does this expansion imply? According to Koh and 
Wilcove (2008), between 55-59%, and at least 56% of land converted for oil palm in 
Malaysia and Indonesia respectively, between 1990 and 2005, was forested land. The 
remainder consisted mostly of agricultural land planted to other crops such as cocoa 
and rubber that were converted for oil palm. Thus, between 1990 and 2005, when 
50,640 km2 of land were added to the total oil palm cropland in Indonesia and 
Malaysia, at least 55% or 27,852 km2 of this amount would have been cleared forests 
(implying an annual loss of at least 1,857 km2 of forests as a result of oil palm 
expansion during that period).  
 
If the projected annual increase in oil palm cultivated area of 6,221 km2 occurs, and 
occurs entirely on the island of Borneo (a major oil palm expansion frontier and home 
to the largest number of orangutans), then the implications for forest loss there and the 
loss of orangutan habitat would be significant. Given that orangutan habitat 
constitutes 35% of the total forest cover in Borneo (the remaining orangutan habitat in 
Borneo as of 2005 being 127,797 km2 (Meijaard and Wich, 2007) and total Bornean 
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forest cover in the same year being 366,365 km2 (Rautner et al., 2005, p. 73)), and 
taking Koh and Wilcove’s (2008) lower bound value of 55%, then at least 1,198 km2 
of Bornean orangutan habitat could be lost each year due to oil palm expansion, 
assuming that orangutan habitat is evenly spread out. If an estimated orangutan 
density of 1 orangutan per km2 is assumed, then at least a thousand orangutans may 
perish each per year. Note that the total remaining number of orangutans in Borneo is 
probably between 40,000 and 50,000 and currently still on the decline (Meijaard and 
Wich, 2007). Other studies indicate sharp decreases in bird and butterfly species when 
primary and logged forests are converted to oil palm plantations (see Koh and 
Wilcove, 2008). Large mammals such the orangutan would be unable to persist in 
such an agricultural landscape, and are not usually tolerated by oil palm farmers who 
consider them as pests. 
 
Because of the significant impact that agricultural conversion has on the highly 
species-rich forests of this Southeast Asian region, conservation biologists have 
suggested that forested lands be avoided as far as it is possible when agricultural 
development is considered. 
 
3. The Proposal to Use Grassland rather than Forested Land for Oil Palm 
Expansion 
 
It has been suggested that pressure for clearing tropical forests for oil palm expansion 
would be moderated if non-forested lands, particularly Imperata cylindrica grasslands 
were used for the planting of oil palm (e.g., Reinhardt et al. 2007; Koh and Wilcove, 
2008). However, the availability of these lands is relatively limited. Garrity et al. 
(1997) estimated that 86,000 km2 of grasslands existed in Indonesia, with a quarter of 
this total amount each to be found in Kalimantan, Borneo and Sumatra. Even if all oil 
palm expansion were restricted to these lands, they would only cater for oil palm 
expansion temporarily. Given the projected annual increase in oil palm cultivated area 
for Indonesia of 4,803 km2 (based on Carter et al., 2007), the extent of grasslands 
estimated by Garrity et al. (1997) for Kalimantan would be able to accommodate only 
4½ years of this expansion. This is assuming that these grasslands are large and 
contiguous, when much of these are rather scattered. Therefore, the respite would be a 
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brief one, if at all these grasslands can be fully or economically used (they may not 
appeal to large-scale planters if no large contiguous grasslands are available). 
 
Secondly, the fact that these lands are not being used currently for oil palm production 
indicates that it is relatively uneconomic to establish oil palm plantations on them 
(especially for smallholders who lack large capital). Presumably, their use for oil palm 
production would need to be subsidised. Although Imperata grasslands can be planted 
with oil palm, they have some soil fertility constraints. These lands will need 
rehabilitation by use of fertiliser and weeding of Imperata grass, which can be labour-
intensive if herbicides are not used (Santoso et al., 1997). Imperata grass can burn 
quite easily. If Imperata grass reestablishes after crop planting, it could pose a fire 
risk and can also harm the proper growth of crops including the oil palm (Chikoye, 
2003). Oil palm planters also prefer forested land because the timber revenue obtained 
by clear-felling the forest helps finance crop planting (Clay, 2004). Thus to induce the 
use of these grasslands, governments need to be committed to designing and 
implementing policies that create incentives for the use of grasslands (by subsidising 
rehabilitation or taxing ‘green’ palm oil lower) and disincentives to exploiting forest 
lands (by applying higher taxes for using forest lands and penalising those who clear-
cut and leave), especially when grasslands or other degraded lands are available. 
International environmental policies, such as those related to reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions, if effectively designed and executed with non-forested lands in mind, could 
shift the pressure of exploitation from forests to degraded lands.  
 
Consider some economic analysis that may be applicable to this case. As mentioned, 
the fact that grassland is not currently being converted to palm oil production 
indicates that it is less profitable than using other types of land, such as forested land, 
for palm oil production. As pointed out above, this situation can only be altered by 
subsidising the growing of oil palm on grassland or by taxing the growing of oil palm 
on forested land or by the government restricting access to forested land for the 
purpose of growing oil palm. There may be a case for taxing the clearing of forests 
because of the negative environmental externalities generated and governments in the 
region may be too willing to make state-owned land available for palm oil 
development. Concessions may be given for use of this land on terms that do not fully 
reflect its market value, let alone its conservation value. The under pricing of forested 
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land made available for oil palm expansion means that the use of forested land for oil 
palm obtains an indirect subsidy. 
 
It can also be argued using economic analysis that the supply of oil palm from 
grasslands is unlikely to result in a significant reduction in the price of palm oil. 
Consequently, the profitability of clearing forest for oil palm expansion remains 
unchanged or is only slightly reduced. Furthermore, there will be a lag in oil supplies 
coming onto the market from grasslands because oil palm takes a while to mature. 
 
Figure 2 illustrates the point that increased supply of palm oil from grasslands is 
likely to have little impact on the price of palm oil. This is because the demand for 
this oil is relatively elastic (its demand curve is relatively flat because there are 
several other vegetable oil substitutes for palm oil) and the increase in the supply of 
palm oil from grasslands would be relatively small. In Figure 2, it is assumed that the 
line S1S1 represents the supply of palm oil if grassland is not used for its production. 
The difference between line S1S1 and S2S2 represent the potential supply of palm oil 
from grassland. The demand curve for palm oil is indicated by line DD. If the market 
happened to be in equilibrium in the initial situation, market equilibrium would be 
established at E1 with X1 of palm oil being supplied. This would sell at P1 per unit. 
Should supplies of oil become available from the grassland, the market equilibrium 
will alter from E1 to E2. There is a slight reduction in the palm oil price from P1 to P0. 
Grasslands account for X1 − X2 of the supply of oil and the supply of oil from other 
than grasslands falls from X1 to X0 once the market has fully adjusted to the extra 
supplies of oil palm from the use of grasslands. There might, therefore, be a slight 
reduction in the amount of forested land cleared for palm oil production. 
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Figure 2: An illustration that if the demand curve for palm oil is relatively elastic, 
an increase in its supply by using grassland does little to reduce its 
supply from other sources. In this case, an increase in the supply of palm 
oil resulting from a shift in the supply curve to the right results in a small 
reduction in the equilibrium price of palm oil and hence, does little to 
reduce its supply from the use of forested areas. 
 
If the demand curve for palm oil is perfectly elastic (a horizontal line) the use of 
grasslands to supply palm oil will not reduce the price of palm oil at all. It will 
therefore, not reduce economic pressure to clear forested land in order to grow oil 
palms. In general, the more elastic the demand for palm oil, the less is the extent to 
which increasing supply of oil from other than forested land mitigates the demand to 
clear forested land to grow oil palm. Furthermore, the reduction in palm oil supply 
from other than grassland will always be less than the increase in supply from the use 
of grassland unless the demand curve for palm oil is perfectly inelastic in which case 
the reduction in oil supply from other than grassland will exactly equal the extra 
supply resulting from the use of grassland. For example, in the illustration given in 
Figure 2, the use of grassland results in an extra supply of palm oil of X2 − X1 but the 
reduction in supply from other areas is only X1 − X0. Thus, this supply-side strategy 
for reducing the use of forested land for oil palm production is much less effective 
than it may appear to be at first sight. 
 
Of course, the model illustrated in Figure 2 is based on comparative statics. At present, 
the oil palm market appears to be in disequilibrium and in the long-term, the demand 
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for palm oil seems to be trending upwards. In such a changing economic situation, use 
of grassland may fail to halt the upward trend in the conversion of forests to grow oil 
palm. At most, it may slow the conversion process. 
 
This is illustrated in Figure 3 using comparative static economic analysis. There D1D1 
represents the original demand curve for palm oil and the line marked D2D2 indicates 
the subsequent demand for palm oil as a function of its price. As before, S1S1 
represents the supply relationship for palm oil in the absence of grasslands being used 
for that purpose. The difference between line S1S1 and S2S2 represents the supply 
curve for palm oil if grasslands are used to supply extra quantities of palm oil. As 
previously explained, in the absence of any other changes, market equilibrium will 
alter from E1 to E2 and the price of palm oil would fall. However, if the market 
demand for palm oil is trending strongly upwards (as appears to be the case in the 
long-term) the equilibrium market price of palm oil can be expected to rise. For 
example, suppose that as grasslands are brought into production to supply palm oil, 
the demand relationship for palm oil shifts up from the line marked by D1D1 to that 
marked by D2D2. Then the market equilibrium changes from E1 to E3 and the price of 
palm oil increases from P1 to P2 despite the increased supply of palm oil from the use 
of grasslands. This increase in the price of palm oil means that there is an economic 
incentive to further expand the area of land planted with oil palm. Therefore, although 
the use of grasslands in this case may slightly reduce the extension of oil palm 
plantations into forested land, the extension continues with only slight abatement. 
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Figure 3: An illustration that a strongly rising demand curve for palm oil may 
more than offset any reduced economic incentive to clear tropical forest 
in order to plant oil palm such as might result from extra supplies of oil 
palm obtained by using grasslands for palm cultivation. 
 
 
4. The View that by Increasing Palm Oil Yields that this will Reduce Economic 
Pressure to Clear Forests in order to Grow Oil Palms 
 
Corley and Tinker (2003, p. 18) and Koh (2007) have argued that if oil palm yields 
can be increased, this could reduce economic pressure to convert additional land, such 
as forested land, to palm oil production. It is frequently highlighted that there is huge 
scope for increasing the yield of oil palm, given that the theoretical yield is 18.6 
tonnes per hectare (Corley, 1996) while average yields in Malaysia and Indonesia 
have usually been slightly below four tonnes per hectare. However, it should be 
recognised that this strategy will not necessarily have the results predicted and could, 
in fact, increase pressure on forested lands as explained below.  
 
The consequences of higher palm oil yields will depend on the impact of the extra 
supply of palm oil on its price and on the areas where the increased yields occur. If 
the increased yields are confined to areas already used for oil palm production or non-
forested land, the similar arguments to those given in relation to Figure 2 apply. The 
increased yields may not reduce the price of palm oil much if the demand for palm oil 
is elastic. Therefore, the demand to clear forests for oil palm production would fall 
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only marginally. If the increased yields are also available to those who clear forested 
land especially smallholders (e.g., if high-yielding planting material is not too costly 
or if fertiliser costs are subsidised), it is even possible that this strategy will accelerate 
the clearing of forested land to grow oil palm. As a result, forest destruction could 
accelerate, biodiversity may be lost at a faster rate than otherwise and the extinction of 
the orangutan could become more probable. This would be a perverse result of this 
proposed strategy. On the other hand, higher yields from oil palm or non-forested land 
might make it easier for governments to deny developers access to forested lands to 
grow oil palms. At the same time, if the higher yields are available from palm oil 
grown in forested areas, political pressure on governments by growers of oil palm to 
release such land is likely to increase.   
 
There are however, benefits to intensification that should not be overlooked by 
plantation-scale oil palm cultivators. Reducing the area of land under cultivation by 
increasing yield can reduce management and labour costs. The abandoning of planted 
area during periods of low prices results in losses. Intensification allows for 
adjustment to price changes without the additional cost of opening up new lands. On 
the whole, these cost savings need to be realised by planters as this can favour 
intensification and reduce extensification. Smallholders who are unable to afford 
better planting material may be provided these at lower prices to discourage them 
from expanding cultivated area, especially during price booms. At the same time, it is 
necessary for the government to put into place policies for restricting crop expansion 
in tandem with supports for increasing intensification. However, as mentioned above, 
it may be very difficult politically for governments to adopt such restrictive policies. 
  
5. Conclusion 
 
It has been shown that the expansion of oil palm plantations in Borneo and Sumatra 
pose a major threat to the conservation of biological diversity in their tropical forest 
areas and are adding considerably to the likelihood of extinction of the orangutan. 
This article illustrates the importance of taking into account economic factors when 
proposing policies for the conservation of wild species. It is argued that the supply-
side strategies of increasing palm oil supplies by using grasslands to grow palm oil are 
unlikely to be effective in significantly mitigating forest clearing. Furthermore, 
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strategies to increase palm oil yields may also be ineffective in reducing the demand 
to convert forests to oil palm plantations. In fact, as is pointed out, they may increase 
the demand for forest conversion, depending on the circumstances. If commodity 
booms occur where demand far exceeds supply, then increases in supply by 
agricultural intensification may not dampen prices enough to mitigate crop expansion 
in the short term. Oil palm expansion will likely continue in the near future given 
strong global demand for oil palm and historically high prices. To effectively 
conserve forests that are valuable orangutan habitat, other measures in addition to the 
supply-side measures discussed in this paper will be needed. These include increasing 
the realisable value of orangutan habitat so that it yields financial returns that are 
comparable to oil palm agriculture on a per-hectare basis. Developing carbon markets 
that creates a demand for forest retention is one option.  
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